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Introduction 
The question of whether perception can be penetrated by 
cognition is in the limelight again. The reason this question 
keeps coming up is that there is so much at stake: Is it pos-
sible to have theory-neutral observation? Is it possible to 
study perception without recourse to expectations, context, 
and beliefs? What are the boundaries between perception, 
memory, and inference (and do they even exist)? Are find-
ings from neuroscience that paint a picture of perception as 
an inherently bidirectional and interactive process relevant 
for understanding the relationship between cognition and 
perception? 
We have assembled a group of philosophers and psy-
chologists who have been considering the thesis of cognitive 
(im)penetrability in light of these questions (Abdel Rahman 
& Sommer, 2008; Goldstone, Landy, & Brunel, 2011; Lu-
pyan, Thompson-Schill, & Swingley, 2010; Macpherson, 
2012; Stokes, 2011). Rather than rehashing previous argu-
ments which appear, in retrospect, to have been somewhat 
ill-posed (Pylyshyn, 1999), this symposium will present a 
thesis of cognitive (im)penetrability that is at once philo-
sophically satisfying, empirically testable, and relevant to 
the questions that cognitive scientists find most interesting. 
Dustin Stokes 
Towards a consequentialist understanding of cognitive 
penetration 
Philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have recent-
ly taken renewed interest in in the cognitive penetration of 
perceptual experience. The question is whether cognitive 
states like belief influence perceptual experience in some 
important way. Since the possible phenomenon is an empir-
ical one, the strategy for analysis has, predictably, proceed-
ed as follows: define the phenomenon and then, definition in 
hand, interpret various psychological data. However, differ-
ent theorists offer different and apparently inconsistent defi-
nitions. And so in addition to the usual problems (e.g., defi-
nitions being challenged by counterexample), an important 
result is that different theorists apply their definitions and 
accordingly get conflicting answers to the question ―Is this a 
genuine case of cognitive penetration?‖ This hurdle to phil-
osophical and scientific progress can be remedied, I argue, 
by returning attention to the alleged consequences of the 
possible phenomenon. There are three: theory-ladenness of 
perception in contexts of scientific theory choice, a threat to 
the general epistemic role of perception, and implications 
for mental architecture. Any attempt to characterize or de-
fine, and then empirically test for, cognitive penetration 
should be constrained by these consequences. This is a 
method for interpreting and acquiring experimental data in a 
way that is agreeable to both sides of the cognitive penetra-
tion debate. Put crudely, the question shifts to ―Is this a 
cognitive-perceptual relation that results in (or constitutes) 
one or more of the relevant consequences?‖ In answering 
this question it may turn out that there is no single unified 
phenomenon of cognitive penetration. But this should not 
matter, since it is the consequences that are of central im-
portance to philosophers and cognitive scientists alike. 
Fiona Macpherson 
Adjudicating between cognitive penetration and per-
ceptual learning 
Do we have good evidence that cognitive penetration oc-
curs? There is a history of disagreement between those who 
think that perceptual experiences can be cognitively pene-
trated and those who think that they cannot. The argument 
has often proceeded on a case-by-case basis. Those who 
think that experiences can be penetrated present alleged ex-
amples. Most of these examples are cases in which it is 
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claimed that there are two different experiences, and that the 
best explanation for this difference is that one of the experi-
ences was penetrated and the other was not or that the two 
experiences were penetrated by different cognitive states. 
Those who think that cognitive penetration does not occur 
try to offer alternative explanations. One kind of alternative 
explanation is that the experiences differ due to a non-cog-
nitive difference—such as a difference in perceptual atten-
tion or in eye movement. In this paper, I discuss one variant 
of this strategy that tries to explain away a case of different 
colour experiences by claiming that the difference is due to 
perceptual learning, untainted by cognition. I discuss what 
evidence we would need to have to show that this case was 
one of penetration, rather than perceptual learning. I claim 
that we have actual evidence which is tantalizingly close to 
being the sort of evidence we require to show cognitive 
penetration, rather than perceptual learning, is occurring, 
and that a modicum of further easy-to-gather evidence 
would probably settle this case in favour of the existence of 
cognitive penetration. 
Rasha Abdel Rahman 
The influence of semantic knowledge on visual percep-
tion 
The perception of complex visual stimuli such as objects 
and faces is determined not only by physical properties but 
may be affected by various sources of top-down influences 
such stored verbal categories or attention. I will present a 
series of experiments examining the influence of different 
types of semantic knowledge on perception, using the fine-
grained temporal resolution of event-related brain potentials 
(ERPs) to localize semantic effects on high and low-level 
components of visual analysis. The different types of 
knowledge include functional information that directly re-
lates to the visual appearance of objects and their specific 
properties, thus explaining object shapes and features. Al-
ternatively, the information may be unrelated to visual prop-
erties. This typically holds for biographical information 
about persons that can neither be derived from vision nor 
account for the visual appearance of a person’s face. Like-
wise, affective biographical knowledge cannot directly be 
related to features or emotional expressions of faces. Fur-
thermore, semantic information is also a major determinant 
of the meaningfulness of verbal categories, and semantic 
contents or the depth of information associated with verbal 
labels may play a critical role in explaining categorical per-
ception. The results show that different types of semantic 
information that may or may not be directly related to visual 
stimulus properties shape the perception of objects and fac-
es, including emotional facial expressions. These effects 
suggest an influence of semantic knowledge on sensory pro-
cessing in the visual cortex that may be mediated by 
knowledge-induced attentional modulations and may reflect 
embodied cognition or reentrant activation form higher-
level semantic to sensory cortical areas. 
 
Robert Goldstone 
Hacking Our Own Perceptual Systems so that Cognition 
Improves 
Training allows our perceptual processes to deliver out-
puts that would have otherwise required abstract or formal 
reasoning. Even without people having any privileged ac-
cess to the internal operations of perceptual modules, these 
modules can be reliably altered over time so as to better 
subserve our high-level cognition needs. Strategic changes 
need not be implicated when perceptual systems adapt. 
However, there is also a continuum of intentional specifici-
ty, and with varying degrees of precision we are also able to 
intentionally alter our perceptual systems for our own pur-
poses. We ―hack‖ our perceptual systems by A) physically 
changing our perceptual equipment, B) strategically em-
ploying our existing perceptual equipment in new ways, C) 
making explicit efforts to accelerate our own perceptual 
adaptation process, D) creating new perceptual objects to 
emphasize task-relevant properties, and E) creating new 
physical tools to help us perceive better. Certainly not all of 
these adaptations should count as cases of cognitive penetra-
tion on perception, but there are striking parallels between 
these five classes. Strategic mechanisms of adaptation de-
monstrably present in some of the classes can be inferred to 
be at work in other classes. The semi-strategic nature of 
perceptual adaptation is well illustrated by the hybrid pro-
cess of educating experts. The training of experts in medi-
cine, sports, engineering, design, and food science has con-
verged on a combination of frequent perceptual exposure to 
cases, explanation of causal mechanisms, and verbal de-
scriptions that lead to selective attention to previously ex-
tracted features as well as organization into new perceptual 
features. 
Discussant: Gary Lupyan 
Toward a cognitive penetrability that we all care about: 
a consequentialist and empirically-testable one. 
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